Iran DNS Propagation Checker
Run a DNS lookup against 6 resolvers located in Iran — Tehran · Tehran · Tehran · Tehran · Tehran · Tehran.
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What checking DNS from Iran tells you
A DNS resolver keeps a cached copy of each record for as long as its time-to-live allows, and does so separately in every location. A change you have published can be live on one resolver while another still serves the old answer.
Checking from Iran looks up the record on servers inside the country, so you see what people there actually get rather than what a resolver on another continent returns.
This matters most right after you edit a record: an update visible on a global resolver like 8.8.8.8 can still be stale at a local ISP in Iran until its cached copy expires. The check confirms the new value has reached the resolvers your Iran visitors depend on.
Ask an Iranian developer which DNS they run and the answer is often "Shecan" or "403", not the resolver their ISP handed them. These are domestic anti-sanction smart resolvers, built by Iranian engineers, that return a transparent-proxy address for sanctioned developer and cloud domains — GitHub, Docker Hub, Google Cloud — so people inside Iran can reach services that block Iranian IP ranges outright. Names that aren't sanctioned resolve normally.
That's one side of a two-way squeeze. The other is state filtering. The incumbent path runs through the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC), whose national resolvers most households get by default, and a blocked domain comes back pointed at a private 10.10.34.x address that lands on a government block page instead of the real record.
Checking a record from inside Iran tells you which reality a given name falls into: the genuine IP, a filtered 10.10.34.x answer, or a Shecan rewrite to a proxy. Query 8.8.8.8 from your desk and you see none of it.
- TIC (Telecommunication Infrastructure Company)217.218.127.127 National incumbent resolver, default for most, state-filtered
- Shecan178.22.122.100 Anti-sanction smart DNS from Iranian engineers
- 403.online10.202.10.202 Anti-sanction resolver on a private, in-country-only address
- Begzar185.55.226.26 Domestic anti-sanction resolver, popular for dev access
Some answers from resolvers inside Iran are shaped by state DNS filtering: blocked domains are returned as a private 10.10.34.x block-page address rather than their real IP.
How DNS propagation works
Every DNS record carries a time-to-live: the seconds a resolver may keep its cached answer before asking again. Change a record and resolvers holding the old value keep serving it until that timer runs out.
Propagation is this expiry playing out across many independent resolvers, so a lower time-to-live set ahead of a change makes it take effect sooner. There is no fixed waiting period — each record's time-to-live decides how long the old answer lingers.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why do DNS servers in Iran return different results than 8.8.8.8?
Two things cause it. Each resolver caches independently, so one can hold an older answer than another.
And content delivery networks reply based on where the asking resolver is, steering a resolver in Iran toward a nearby edge node.
Both answers can be correct at the same time for their own location.
How long until a DNS change is visible in Iran?
It depends on the record's time-to-live, not on the country.
Resolvers in Iran keep the previous answer until their cached copy expires, then pick up the new one.
If you lowered the time-to-live before making the change, it appears sooner; otherwise the old value can persist until the original timer elapses.
Which DNS server should users in Iran use?
For most people the resolver their internet provider assigns is fine and usually the lowest latency.
Anyone who wants an alternative can point to a public resolver reachable from Iran, such as Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) or Google (8.8.8.8); the right choice depends on whether you value speed, privacy, or filtering.
Why check DNS from Iran specifically?
Because it shows what visitors in Iran actually resolve, which can differ from a global lookup.
If your audience is in Iran, or you have moved hosting or mail there, checking against in-country resolvers confirms the records have reached the servers those users rely on.
Why do people in Iran use Shecan or 403.online instead of 8.8.8.8?
US sanctions make many developer and cloud services (GitHub, Docker Hub, Google Cloud, npm) refuse connections from Iranian IP ranges. Shecan and 403.online are domestic smart resolvers that hand back a transparent-proxy IP for those specific domains, so the request reaches the service from a whitelisted address, while non-sanctioned names resolve straight through. A public resolver like 8.8.8.8 returns the real IP, which then gets rejected at the far end.
Does DNS filtering in Iran change the answer I get?
Yes. For domains the state blocks — many news, political, and adult sites, plus some circumvention tools — resolvers on the incumbent TIC path return a private 10.10.34.x address (the block-page IP) instead of the real record. Iran runs more than one filter with slightly different signatures (10.10.34.34, .35 and .36). A lookup from inside Iran can therefore show a poisoned answer that a resolver outside the country never sees.
